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1 Introduction 
The health of employees is an important cost factor for firms and a key determinant of 
the productivity of an economy. Although, due to the complexity of the issue, it is difficult to 
obtain precise and undisputable numbers of direct costs and productivity losses, rough esti-
mates suggest, for example, that the bad quality of the air in US firms alone lead to annual 
costs of about 250 bn. USD due to additional medical expenses and lost productivity.1 For 
Germany, the country we study in this paper, BMAS (2014) estimates that in 2012, with on 
average 14 work days lost per worker, production losses due to illness amounted to 53 bn. 
EUR (corresponding to 92 bn. EUR in terms of value added). Although such numbers must be 
interpreted with care, they show the large potential gains that could be realised by improving 
employees’ health. Thus, it is not surprising that health issues receive considerable attention 
from national governments, as well as from supranational and international agencies.2 
Employers are of course also interested in the good health of their workforce. They can 
influence the health of their employees in two different ways: First, they can provide a work-
place that fosters, or is at least not detrimental to, health. Second, they may encourage their 
employees to pursue a healthier life style in general by providing information, incentives, and 
opportunities (e.g. courses about healthy eating or subsidies for a fitness centre). Many larger 
firms follow such strategies and the economic benefits for employers and the positive health 
effects for employees have been documented extensively in the public health literature.3 How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge the literature still lacks a thorough investigation of the ef-
fects of such measures on future labour market outcomes of employees.  
                                                                
1  See New York Times (2013). 
2  An example for the latter at the European level is the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (OSHA, 
https://osha.europa.eu/en). At the international level, safety at work is an important topic for the Internal Labour 
Organization (ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/safety-and-health-at-work), for example. 
3  For an excellent review of the literature see Kreis and Bödeker (2004), which covers 25 high-quality review articles that 
summarize more than 400 studies, as well as Sockoll, Kramer and Bödeker (2009), which is an update of the earlier 
survey and covers 40 review articles that summarize more than 1000 studies. 
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There are several reasons why this appears important. Firstly, workers with health 
problems have a higher probability of receiving payments from public transfer systems such 
as unemployment insurance, welfare schemes or disability insurance because they face a 
higher risk of becoming (and staying) unemployed as well as of leaving the labour market 
early (e.g. Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2009). Therefore, it is of interest for policy makers 
whether such employer policies reduce dependency rates and if so, whether the effects are 
sufficiently large to justify their active promotion using public funding. Secondly, reduced 
turnover due to improved worker-firm matches not only reduces turnover costs for firms, but 
may also stabilise workers’ careers, which has positive effects on lifetime wealth (especially 
pension wealth) and on contributions to the social insurance system. Finally, health-improving 
measures adopted by firms may increase the labour market attachment of elderly workers, 
thus alleviating the negative effects of the demographic change in terms of both shortage of 
skilled workers and financial strains on the pension system.    
It is the objective of this paper to fill this gap. We analyse the impact of selected health 
promotion measures provided by firms on medium-term labour market outcomes of employ-
ees in Germany. Our study is based on unique linked employer-employee data combining 
administrative records of individual labour market histories with a panel survey of firm estab-
lishments and regional statistics. Among many other characteristics, the panel survey contains 
information about the establishments’ provision of specific health promotion activities. Based 
on this information, we separately investigate the effects of two classes of measures which 
have been introduced in firms between 2002 and 2004: (i) systematic analysis of sickness 
absenteeism in the firm, (ii) courses to improve the health knowledge and health-seeking be-
haviour of the firms’ employees, as well as (iii) so-called health circles where health problems 
are discussed in groups with the aim of finding ways to alleviate or overcome these problems. 
The administrative records allow us to assess individual labour market outcomes in terms of 
employment, unemployment, firm-provided early retirement, inactivity, and turnover from 
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mid-2004 to the end of 2008. Furthermore, they also provide individual worker characteristics 
as well as information about the composition of the establishments’ work forces prior to any 
health promotion, which (in addition to the firm characteristics from the survey and the re-
gional information) can be used to control for selection into these measures.  
As with any such study, it is most interesting to estimate the effects of the health inter-
ventions on labour market outcomes rather than merely uncovering statistical associations 
between interventions and outcomes. In the absence of experimental evidence (which is ap-
parently more difficult and expensive to obtain because labour market outcomes take longer 
to materialize than many health outcomes) or any other exogenous outside variation influ-
encing the establishments’ implementation of health promotion measures, our identification 
strategy has to rely on a different approach. Firstly, we eliminate the potential problem that 
workers may select themselves into establishments offering health services: On the one hand, 
we focus on establishments that had no such offerings by mid-2002, thus equalising firms in 
that respect. On the other hand, we only consider workers who entered the respective estab-
lishments at least two years prior to mid-2002. Secondly, by conditioning on a rich set of firm, 
worker, and regional characteristics coming from the various data sources, we account for the 
selective introduction of such measures in some firms between 2002 and 2004. Thirdly, since 
we are interested in individual labour market outcomes of employees, we use the panel struc-
ture of the data and take-out unobserved factors and differential trends that determine labour 
market performance by conditioning on long-run pre-implementation labour market out-
comes. Some placebo-like tests implicit in our results support our strategy. 
Our results suggest that the investigated health promotion activities have mixed effects 
on employees’ labour market outcomes. Analysing sickness absenteeism, an intervention that 
only passively involves the employees, is found to have a rather limited impact. This measure 
is merely found to somewhat reduce the number of employer changes of younger and mid-
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aged workers after 3-4 years. In contrast, health courses and health circles, which activate 
employees directly, increase tenure in the studied firm and reduce overall turnover among all 
age groups. Moreover, for older workers, who are most likely to suffer from health problems 
and are thus of particular interest, the measures strengthen labour market attachment. They 
significantly increase employment by reducing unemployment and thereby dependence on 
unemployment insurance payments, as well as by reducing exits from the labour market via a 
specific type of firm-provided early retirement scheme. Thus, besides the beneficial effects on 
firms and employees’ health documented in the previous literature, there also seem to be ad-
ditional benefits in the longer run for both employees and social insurance systems. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we briefly describe several aspects 
of the health policies of German firms. Section 3 is devoted to data and measurement issues 
and provides selected descriptive statistics. Section 4 contains the discussion of the identifica-
tion strategy and presents the estimator used. Section 5 empirically characterises the estab-
lishments implementing the different measures and presents the estimated effects for the 
health promotion activities considered in this paper. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A con-
tains extensive descriptive statistics, while Appendix B contains additional results omitted 
from the main body of the paper. 
2 Firms’ health policies in Germany 
The Initiative for Health and Work (Initiative für Gesundheit und Arbeit, IGA) provides 
a summary of legally required and voluntarily provided measures of German firms to ensure 
and improve the safety and health of employees at their workplace (IGA, 2009). Our study 
focuses on voluntary measures that we will describe in more detail in the following. With one 
exception, the German measures are largely comparable to those of other counties.4 Com-
                                                                
4  See the compilation of measures on http://www.enwhp.org/european-toolbox.html. 
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prehensive and internationally comparable data on the use of health promotion measures at 
the work place is, unfortunately, rare. One of the few data sources that provide at least some 
information is the European Survey of Enterprises on New and Emerging Risks, which has 
been conducted by the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work in 2009.  
Figure 2.1: Share of establishments answering ‘yes’ to various questions about workplace 
health promotion in 2009 by country and establishment size 
    
Source:Own graph based on data from the European Survey of Enterprises on New and Emerging Risks (ESENER) 2009. 
Data was retrieved from https://osha.europa.eu/sub/esener/en/front-page on June 12, 2014. The right panel uses the 
data from all 31 European countries included in the survey. 
The left panel of Figure 2.1 shows the share of establishments that implemented differ-
ent health and safety procedures in Germany and Europe. 54% of German and 75% of Euro-
pean establishments have at least some formalized health and safety procedure, 35% of Ger-
man, and 50% of European establishments routinely analyse sickness absenteeism and, re-
spectively, 15% and 26% have some procedure to deal with work-related stress. Moreover, 
the right panel of Figure 2.1 shows that the prevalence of the measures quite strongly in-
creases with establishment size with differences of 20-30 percentage points between the 
smallest and the largest firms. 
The measures most frequently adopted by German firms coincide with the ones sur-
veyed in the IAB Establishment Panel, which is a representative survey of establishments5 in 
                                                                
5  An establishment is either a single firm, or comprises all branches of a larger firm within the same relatively narrowly 
defined region and industry. In the following, we will use the terms establishment and firm interchangeably. 
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Germany and also part of the data we use. Questions about health promoting activities of 
firms were included in the 2002 and 2004 questionnaires. The shares of establishments that 
offer a respective health measure are displayed in Table 2.1 for both years.  
Table 2.1: Share of establishments offering different health policies implemented by firms in 
the IAB Establishment Panel 2002 and 2004 
Health measure 2002 2004 
Analysis of sickness absenteeism 30% 29% 
Surveys of employees about health risks at the workplace 19% 18% 
Discussion groups about health problems in the workplace (health circles) 10% 9% 
Courses about healthy behaviour 14% 15% 
Other than the above mentioned 12% 10% 
None of the above 54% 56% 
Missing information 0.5% 0.4% 
Total number of observations 15682 16063 
Note:  Multiple answers are possible. See Appendix C for the question underlying this table. 
With about 30% of establishments using it, the most popular measure is a systematic 
analysis of sickness absenteeism in the firm. Because of reporting requirements, most firms 
have some records on sickness absenteeism and a significant share of them uses these data to 
gain knowledge about potential problems and possible solutions. To do so, firms analyse the 
incidence of absenteeism, average duration, causes, systematic patterns, and the characteris-
tics of the absentees and often compare their numbers to other businesses in the same industry 
(IGA, 2009). Secondly, to collect information on health risks and mental or physical pressures 
experienced or perceived by employees as well as potential complaints almost 20% of firms 
conduct anonymous employee surveys (IGA, 2009). About 15% of firms offer health courses 
that comprise talks and lectures to advise workers on health issues such as a healthy working 
position, healthy eating or drug use, learning exercises to improve, for example, back mus-
cles. Furthermore, there are relaxation courses, courses for people who want to give up 
smoking, and so on (IGA, 2009). About 10% of establishment make use of so-called health 
circles, which are a particularity of the German system. These are discussion groups where 
employees and sometimes supervisors collect information about work-related health prob-
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lems, stress or psychological pressures, and their causes and discuss possible solutions. Usu-
ally, a health circle is set up for a limited period (6-10 meetings) and followed by the creation 
of a within-firm working group of employees, which seeks to implement improvements (IGA, 
2009). 10-12% of firms also use a variety of other measures such as free access to or subsidies 
for fitness clubs, health days, and sports events. Finally, about 55% of establishments do not 
offer any health promotion measures.  
3 Data and definition of the sample 3.1 Data  
Our empirical analysis relies on unique linked employer-employee data that combine 
different administrative and survey data sets from the Federal Employment Agency's Institute 
of Employment Research (IAB). The data is based on the IAB Establishment Panel, which is 
a representative survey of German establishments. It covers a broad spectrum of firm level 
information including firm size, industry, legal form, biographical data, structure of the work 
force (e.g. education, occupation, share of males/females), employee turnover, vacancies and 
labour demand, working hours, and human resource policies (e.g. flexible work time, inclina-
tion to recruit older workers). Furthermore, there is information on training activities, finan-
cial revenues and profits, investment activities, usage rate, technological and organizational 
factors, and use of financial support or subsidies, among many others. The survey was first 
conducted in 1993 and is annually repeated. It is an unbalanced panel due to attrition and the 
inclusion of new companies over time.  
The information from the IAB Establishment Panel has been merged with the so-called 
IAB Establishment History Panel that includes a rich set of aggregate information on the 
firm’s employees. The variables describe the composition of a firm’s work force, for example 
in terms of age, education, tenure, and earnings. They are based on the employees’ social in-
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surance records and are constructed, for each year, from the cross section of all workers em-
ployed in the firm on June 30. 
For the firms in our sample, described in more detail below, the social insurance records 
of their employees for the years 1990-2008 were merged to the firm data. They comprise em-
ployment, unemployment and earnings histories, as well as a rich set of personal characteris-
tics for all workers employed by the firms in our data on June 30, 2002. The social insurance 
records have also been used, for example, by Wunsch and Lechner (2008), Biewen et al. 
(2013), Wunsch (2013), and Lechner and Wunsch (2013), with a different sampling design, 
though. Finally, the data also contain a rich set of regional characteristics, merged via county 
identifiers from regional statistics, such as the federal state, urbanization, and local labour 
market conditions. 
3.2 Selection of the sample and definition of treatments 
Our empirical analysis is based on a subsample of the establishments included in the 
IAB Establishment Panel (IAB-EP) in 2002. For this project, we had access to a linked em-
ployer-employee dataset that covers 2,819 of the 15,682 establishments in the 2002 wave of 
the IAB-EP. Excluded are establishments with less than 100 employees (about 75% of all 
2002 firms), the 25 largest firms, and firms in the sectors agriculture, foresting, mining, en-
ergy, transportation, messaging, education and social insurance (about 20% of all 2002 
firms).6 For design purposes, we focus on estimating the effects of the introduction of work-
place health promotion measures between mid-2002 and mid-2004. This requires, firstly, that 
we are able to measure the use of these measures both in 2002 and in 2004. Due to relatively 
high attrition rates in the IAB-EP and a small amount of item non-response, this reduces the 
original sample by 30%. Secondly, firms that already offered health promotion measures in 
                                                                
6  This paper is part of a larger cooperation project with the IAB, which focused on intra-firm comparisons of workers in the 
primary and tertiary private sector. The former required a sufficiently large numbers of employees per firms. For the latter, 
sectors with large public shares in the past were excluded as well. 
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mid-2002 are also excluded. This affects a relatively large number of firms, but is essential for 
identification as we discuss in detail below.7 To avoid common support problems, we also 
exclude firms in East Germany and Berlin (14%), as well as establishments with more than 
800 employees (32%), with more than 10% of temporary workers (0.8%), or firms indicating 
‘problems because their work force is too old’ (3%), as these characteristics almost perfectly 
predict whether firms offer health promotion measures in 2004. Hence, firms with and with-
out such measures cannot be ‘made comparable’ with respect to these characteristics.  
Our analysis is concerned with the individual-level outcomes of the employees of the 
firms in our sample. We only consider workers of age 31 to 60 years (in June 2002). This 
condition ensures that workers are sufficiently distant to educational choices and statutory 
retirement age (65). As one may suspect that health promotion activities have different effects 
on younger and older workers (because the former are in general less subject to health prob-
lems), we conduct the empirical analysis within three age-specific strata (31-40, 41-50, 51-
60). For design purposes, explained below, we also exclude workers with less than 2 years of 
tenure with their employer.  
As already mentioned in Section 2, the information about the different health promotion 
activities comes from the 2002 and 2004 waves of the IAB-EP. Establishments were asked to 
state which type of health promotion they implemented or supported, or whether they did not 
implement or support any such measure (see Appendix C for the exact survey question). For 
reasons of sample size and homogeneity, we group establishments into three so-called ‘treat-
ments’ based on this information. The first group of establishments indicated to analyse sick-
ness-related absenteeism. We use the short-cut SickAna for this intervention. The second 
                                                                
7  Table A.1 in Appendix A contains cross tabulations of the answers to the questions about the use of health promotion 
measures in 2002 and 2004 for all establishments that participated in the 2002 and in the 2004 waves of the IAB 
Establishment Panel, have non-missing entries for the respective question, and are part of the linked-employer-employee 
data used in this project. It shows the numbers of establishments that are relevant for the empirical analysis before 
removing firms with at least one measure in 2002 and before applying further restrictions to ensure common support. 
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group consists of establishments that introduced health circles and/or health courses (Courses) 
for their employees. In this group, 23% of establishments offered health circles, 91% health 
courses, and 14% implemented both measures. It should be noted that, unfortunately, it is 
unknown whether individual workers actually participate in Courses. It appears reasonable to 
assume that participation in Courses has an effect at least as large as the mere offer of such an 
opportunity (which may or may not be taken up). Hence, the estimated effect of the offer rep-
resents a lower bound on the effect of actual participation of workers. Note that the first and 
second groups may overlap to some extent: 35% of the establishments offering Course also 
used SickAna. Of those implementing SickAna, 9% offered health circles and 23% health 
courses. Unfortunately, sample size considerations prevent us from analysing the other op-
tions mentioned in the survey (see Table 2.1),8 or from analysing courses and health circles 
separately. Finally, the third group (the control group or so-called ‘non-treated’) consists of 
establishments that did neither implement nor support any health measure and does therefore 
not overlap with SickAna or Course. The resulting sample sizes of firms and workers for each 
stratum and treatment are displayed in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Number of firms and individuals per stratum 
Health measure Analysis of sickness absenteeism Health circles/courses 
Age 31-40 41-50 51-60 31-40 41-50 51-60 
Number of firms 163 162 163 197 196 197 
Number  of workers 11227 11323 7670 9693 10124 6732 
 3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 contains a first description of the data in terms of the means of selected varia-
bles by age stratum and treatment status.9 The four upper panels describe the underlying 
                                                                
8  The alternative of grouping them together with either SickAna or Course would lead to a very heterogeneous group of 
measures. The estimated effects for such a group would be very difficult to interpret. 
9  A more extensive set of descriptive statistics can be found in Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A. Due to the very large 
number of variables in the data (several hundred) we abstain from presenting statistics on all variables. They are available 
on request. The information available in the administrative data is well documented in Wunsch and Lechner (2008) and 
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population of workers and establishments prior to treatment in June 2002. The lower panel 
contains outcome variables measured from July 2004 to December 2008.  
Establishments that offer health courses and/or health circles are quite distinct from the 
other establishments. On average, they are larger and employ more women. This coincides 
with higher shares of part-time employment and lower shares of firms active in manufactur-
ing. They also operate under more difficult economic circumstances, with lower regional 
GDP growth rates, fewer jobs per inhabitant, and lower investments per employee. In con-
trast, firms that analyse sickness absenteeism are quite similar to firms that do not offer any 
health promotion measures. Somewhat larger differences only occur with respect to the share 
of establishments in the manufacturing sector, which is lower for the latter firms, and invest-
ments per employee, which is are higher.  
Concerning potential reasons for introducing health promotion measures, it is interest-
ing to see that fewer firms who state to have problems with high absenteeism introduce health 
promotion measures. Instead, there is a positive correlation between the introduction of such 
measures and having a work council, i.e. a formal representation of employees in the firm, as 
well as having difficulties to hire skilled workers. The latter seems to suggest that health pro-
motion measures may have been introduced by firms to be more attractive for skilled workers. 
Also interesting from the point of potential selection problems is the observation that the la-
bour market performance of a firm’s employees prior to treatment is very similar for all 
treatment groups and hence, seems to be unrelated to whether or not firms introduce health 
promotion measures at the work place. This suggests that by limiting our sample to workers 
with at least 2 years of tenure in the studied firms before potential treatment we largely suc-
ceeded in eliminating bias due to self-selection of workers into firms. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Lechner and Wunsch (2013). For a detailed documentation of the variables available in the IAB Establishment Panel, see 
http://fdz.iab.de/de/FDZ_Establishment_Data/IAB_Establishment_Panel/IAB_Establishment_Panel_Working_Tools.aspx 
and for those in the IAB Establishment History Panel see http://fdz.iab.de/de/FDZ_Establishment_Data/ Establishment_ 
History_Panel/Establishment_History_Panel_Working_Tools.aspx . 
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Table 3.2: Selected descriptive statistics by stratum and treatment status  
Age in 2002 (stratum) 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60 
Health measure (treatment) None Sick-Ana 
Cour-
se None 
Sick-
Ana 
Cour-
se None 
Sick-
Ana 
Cour-
se 
 Establishment characteristics 
Manufacturing sector 0.46 0.62 0.29 0.47 0.58 0.25 0.43 0.58 0.27 
Number of employees  301 304 361 304 301 372 298 310 364 
Problems with high absenteeism 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 
Difficulties hiring skilled employees 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.33 0.38 0.46 0.33 0.38 0.51 
Firm has a works council  0.80 0.86 0.89 0.84 0.87 0.91 0.86 0.89 0.90 
Investment per employee /10000 0.75 0.68 0.35 0.77 0.72 0.33 0.74 0.65 0.30 
 Individual characteristics of employees (shares) 
Women  0.39 0.37 0.49 0.42 0.44 0.55 0.44 0.43 0.52 
Part-time employed 0.17 0.15 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.30 
No vocational degree 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.15 
 Regional characteristics 
Jobs per inhabitant aged 15-64  1.2 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.2 0.7 1.4 1.2 0.7 
GDP growth 1994 to 2002 in % 23 22 19 24 22 19 23 22 19 
 Pre-treatment outcomes (individual level) 
Share employed in past 10 years 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.94 
Share unemployed in past 10 years 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Share inactive in past 10 years 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 Outcome variables (individual level) 
Cumulated months   2/2004 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.0 5.0 5.1 
employed until end of 2/2008 48.7 49.3 49.5 48.6 49.1 49.9 36.4 37.1 38.3 
Cum. months in early ret. 2/2004 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.6 
scheme10 until end of 2/2008 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 6.3 5.5 7.1 
Cum. months unemployed 2/2004 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 
until end of  2/2008 1.8 1.8 1.2 2.3 2.0 1.5 4.2 3.7 2.4 
Number of employer 2/2004 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
changes until end of 2/2008 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Tenure after June 30, 2004 in years 4.9 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.4 5.5 4.2 4.5 4.6 
# of employees (observations) 6247 4858 3312 6613 4622 3420 4366 3073 2135 
Note:  Statistics are based on the samples used for estimation. If not explicitly mentioned otherwise, variables are meas-
ured in 2002. 1/200x denotes the first half of the 200x, while 2/200x denotes the second half of this year. For all cu-
mulated measures, accumulation begins in 2/2004. 
In terms of outcome variables, the differences between the three groups of firms are 
mostly small. Somewhat larger differences are mainly visible for the elderly who exhibit more 
time in employment and less time in unemployment if employed in firms that offer health 
courses and/or circles rather than in firms that do not offer any health promotion measures. 
                                                                
10  The administrative records allow measuring one specific type of firm-provided early retirement scheme, which is called 
“Altersteilzeit” in German. Workers who want to retire early sign a 6-year contract with the firm. They either work full-
time at a reduced wage for 3 years and then stop working but continue to receive the same wage for 3 more years (so-
called block model, which is by far the most common case), or they work part-time at a reduced wage for the full 6-year 
period. In both cases, workers are recorded in the data for the full 6-year period. Eligibility starts at age 55. 
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This might be suggestive of a positive effect of these measures in this age group. In the econ-
ometric analysis below, we will assess whether this is indeed the case. 
4 Empirical strategy 4.1 Identification  
We are interested in the effects of a firm offering a certain type of workplace health 
promotion measure compared to not offering any such measure on the labour outcomes of the 
firm’s employees. To disentangle these effects from other determinants of the worker’s labour 
market outcomes, two selection problems need to be solved. Firstly, workers may self-select 
into firms that offer certain health promotion measures. We approach this problem by 
focusing on firms that did not offer any such measure by mid-2002 and by only considering 
workers who have been with the firm for at least 2 years by mid-2002. Hence, all workers we 
include in the analysis joined the firms at a point in time when they did not offer, and it was 
not foreseeable that they will offer, any health promotion measure. 
The second selection problem arises because firms selectively rather than randomly in-
troduced health promotion measures between mid-2002 and mid-2004. This also became visi-
ble when comparing the characteristics of the firms across treatment states in Section 3.3. To 
solve a large part of this problem, we exploit that the data are very informative and allow us to 
capture most of the potential drivers of the decision to introduce health measures and of 
workers’ labour market outcomes (so-called ‘confounders’).  
From a theoretical perspective, taking the view of a profit maximising enterprise, health 
promotion measures should be introduced if they are cost-effective. Firm performance, which 
also depends on the economic situation in the region and industry, is one of the most obvious 
factors because it affects the financial means available for costly health promotion. Firm size 
appears to be an important determinant of health promotion costs per employee, given that 
14  
introductory fixed costs, e.g. for building up the infrastructure, are non-negligible. The poten-
tial returns from these measures depend on health risks that differ a lot by industry and oc-
cupation but also by individual characteristics, such as education and age, because of different 
health knowledge and health investments. They also depend on health problems evident in the 
firm such as high absenteeism and high accident rates. Finally, the bargaining power of em-
ployees may play an important role in introducing health promotion measures. A strong repre-
sentation of workers’ interest, e.g. via a works council in the firm or strong unionization, is 
more likely to enforce better working conditions. All of these factors (that determine the 
firms’ decision to engage in health promotion activities) are likely to affect individual 
workers’ labour market outcomes as well. Thus, they need to be controlled for. 
The importance of these factors is also confirmed by several empirical studies, mostly in 
the public health literature, which have investigated the relationship between firm character-
istics and health promotion. Kenkel and Supina (1992) analyse data from the US National 
Survey of Worksite Health Promotion Programs and find that firm size, the share of females, 
and corporate health insurance plans are positively correlated with health promotion, while 
employee turnover is negatively associated with the latter. Based on the same data, Fielding 
and Piserchia (1989) conclude that health promotion activities also vary with industry and 
region. Due to different institutional settings with respect to health policies in the US and 
Germany, the results of studies using German data appear particularly relevant in our context. 
Ulmer and Gröben (2005) use a survey of firms in the German states of Hessia and Thuringia 
and find that firm size, the number of work accidents, and profit expectations are significantly 
associated with health promoting activities. Hollederer (2007) uses the unrestricted version of 
the IAB Establishment Panel and concludes that health promotion varies considerably with 
federal states, industry, firm size, and the presence or absence of a works council. Based on a 
phone survey among German insurance companies, Köhler et al. (2009) argue that firm size 
and particular firm policies, such as human resources and organizational development 
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policies, are related to health promotion. Finally, Jung et al. (2012) investigate the relationship 
between firm characteristics and the attitude towards health promotion in a survey among 
German information and communication technology companies. They find a firm’s market 
position and the percentage of employees with an academic education to be associated with a 
positive attitude towards health promotion among small companies.  
Table 4.1 summarizes the factors identified above from the theoretical considerations 
and the empirical literature and indicates how we can capture them with our data. However, 
two factors we cannot capture: The first one is the availability of health insurance plans. 
However, this is not relevant in the German context because health insurance is compulsory 
for everyone. The second missing factor is related to accidents at work. This is only captured 
indirectly by controlling for industry, occupation, and the share of employment contracts in 
the last 10 years that ended due to prolonged illness of more than 6 weeks. These factors are 
very likely to be strongly correlated with the rate of accidents. They represent potentially 
important confounders per se. 
To address the issue of any potentially remaining unobserved factors and differential 
trends that drive workers’ labour market outcomes, either via their current or past employers 
or other individual factors, we additionally exploit the panel structure of the data which allows 
us to observe at least 10 years of detailed pre-treatment labour market outcomes for all work-
ers in our sample. By conditioning on a variety of summary measures of the workers’ labour 
market performance over the 10 years prior to mid-2002, we not only take out any time-con-
stant unobserved factors (fixed effects) that drive labour market outcomes, but also any dif-
ferential long-term trends. The latter is so because we essentially ‘equalize’ workers in terms 
of all kinds of dimensions of labour market performance over the 10 years prior to mid-2002. 
The exact specification we use for selection correction is described in the next section 
and summarized in the last column of Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of potential confounders and control variables available in the data 
Potential confounders Variables available in the data Variables included in the estimation 
Firm performance Total revenues, evaluation of the business 
situation, investments per employee, age of firm, 
use of government subsidies, establishment is 
single firm 
Investments per employee, age of firm, 
indicator for no use of government sub-
sidies, establishment is single firm 
Firm size Firm size Firm size 
Industry of the firm Industry of the firm Industry of the firm 
Occupation of the employees Occupation of the employees Occupation of the employees 
Turnover Distribution of tenure in firm, number of entries 
and exits over last year, tenure of individual 
employees 
Tenure of individual employees 
Strong worker representation Indicators for whether firm has works council, is 
subject to sectorial or firm-specific wage con-
tract, follows sectorial wage contract or is not 
subject to a wage contract 
Indicators for whether firm has works 
council or is subject to sectorial wage 
contract 
Region and its economic 
situation 
Region dummies, unemployment rate, migration, 
commuting, dummies for urban and rural areas, 
population density, GDP growth, jobs per inhab-
itant aged 15-64, earnings per capita 
Region dummies, GDP growth, jobs per 
inhabitant aged 15-64 
Composition of the firm's 
workforce/ individual char-
acteristics of employees 
Gender, age, education, nationality, part-
time/full-time, earnings distribution, occupations, 
blue-collar/white-collar job 
Gender, age, education, forigner status, 
part-time/full-time, earnings, occupation 
Firm policies Dozens of variables measuring various human 
resource policies, restructuring activities, organi-
zational factors 
Firm has difficulties hiring skilled em-
ployees, firm uses working time ac-
counts 
Absenteeism Firm states to have problems with high absen-
teeism 
Firm states to have problems with high 
absenteeism 
Number of work accidents - Industry of the firm, occupation of the 
employees, share of employment con-
tracts in the last 10 years that ended due 
to prolonged illness of more than 6 
weeks 
Corporate health insurance 
plans 
- Not relevant in the German context 
because of compulsory health insurance 
for everyone 
Other factors and differential 
trends 
More than 200 variables with half-yearly meas-
urements of different types of employment, 
unemployment, receipt of unemployment insur-
ance, wage earnings, program participation and 
inactivity; average duration and number of spells 
of employment/unemployment/program partici-
pation/inactivity, over the last 10 years  
Fraction of time employed/unemployed/ 
inactive in past 10 years 
Note: All variables that are available in the data but are not used in the estimation have been tested in omitted variable 
tests. They are highly correlated with the included variables and therefore do not add much explanatory power. 4.2 Estimation  
Any estimator which eliminates selection based on observed factors is built on the idea 
of comparing outcomes across units with and without treatment that are similar with respect 
to observed confounders in order to pin down the causal effect of the treatment. Instead of 
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using parametric OLS, we apply a propensity-score-matching estimator that defines similarity 
in terms of a function of the probability to be treated conditional on the confounders. In the 
program evaluation literature, this conditional probability is referred to as propensity score 
(see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). An advantage of these estimators is that they are semi-
parametric and therefore more robust than parametric methods like OLS, and that they allow 
for flexible effect heterogeneity (see Huber, Lechner and Wunsch, 2011, for an application in 
health economics).  
We use radius matching on the propensity score with regression adjustment as sug-
gested in  Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2011) to estimate the average effects of the two 
measures relative to ‘no such measure’. This estimator is more precise than nearest neighbour 
matching (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002), remains consistent if either the matching step is 
based on a correctly specified propensity score model, or the regression model is correctly 
specified (so-called double robustness property, see e.g. Rubin, 1979, Joffe et al., 2004), re-
duces small sample as well as asymptotic biases of matching (Abadie and Imbens, 2006), and 
appears to perform well in finite samples, also compared to OLS (Huber, Lechner, and 
Wunsch, 2013), but without having to rely on functional form assumptions. 
To obtain the propensity scores required for selection correction, we estimate 6 separate 
probit models, one for each measure considered, SickAna and Course, and each of the 3 age 
strata. The dependent variable in any subsample is zero for workers in firms without any 
health measure and one otherwise (if the respective health measure is provided). All probit 
models and their results are presented in Appendix B.1. The specifications result from the 
identification issues discussed above as well as extensive specification tests for normality, 
heteroscedasticity and in particular omitted variables. The data contain hundreds of variables, 
a lot of them being highly correlated. We started with a parsimonious specification that in-
cluded the most important potential confounders according to the empirical literature and the-
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oretical considerations summarized in Table 4.1. Based on omitted variables tests for all vari-
ables in the data, we sequentially added additional variables if suggested by the test statistics.  
The final specifications include gender, age, foreigner status, wages, tenure in June 
2002, and indicators for part-time work, education, and occupation to capture the main deter-
minants of workers’ labour market performance as well as occupational health risks. Addi-
tionally, we include three summary measures of labour market performance in the past 10 
years as pre-treatment outcomes to take out any other time constant unobserved factors that 
affect workers’ labour market performance. We also include regional indicators and two vari-
ables capturing regions’ economic performance as additional determinants of both individual 
labour market performance and firm performance where the latter may affect the financial 
means available to introduce health promotion measures. This is also true for firms’ age, size 
and investments per employee as well as an indicator for establishments that do not use any 
government subsidies or represent a single firm. To capture health risks and other incentives 
to introduce health promotion measures, we finally include indicators for the industry, for 
firms stating to have problems with high absenteeism or difficulties hiring skilled workers, for 
having a works council or being subject to a sectorial wage contract, and the share of em-
ployment contracts in the past 10 years that ended due to prolonged illness of the employee.  
Based on the estimated propensity scores, we ensure overlap of the distributions of the 
covariates in the treated and nontreated samples by excluding treated individuals with scores 
higher than the maximum among the nontreated and, similarly, nontreated individuals with 
scores lower than the minimum among the treated. Applying the matching technique outlined 
above on the common support results in very satisfactory balancing of the covariate distribu-
tions across treated and untreated establishments. This holds not only for the variables enter-
ing the respective propensity score specifications, but also for variables not explicitely 
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included, in particular the large number of workers’ pre-treatment labour market outcomes 
and firm characteristics.11  
4.3 Inference  
P-values to test whether the estimated effects are different form zero are obtained from a 
block bootstrap that resamples establishments (rather than individuals) along with all their 
employees to account for clustering at the establishment level.12 We use 499 bootstrap replica-
tions and compute the bootstrap t-statistics of the respective average effects in each of the 
samples (recentered by the estimated effect in the original sample). We then estimate the p-
value as the share of absolute bootstrap t-statistics that are larger than the absolute t-statistic in 
the original sample.13 
5 Results 
The individual administrative records allow computing a large number of outcome vari-
ables, which measure different dimensions of employees’ labour market performance from 
July 2004 to December 2008 (see Table A.2 in Appendix A for a comprehensive list of all 
variables). With one exception, they are measured in the second half of June or December of a 
given year, either as binary labour market status indicators or income measures for that par-
ticular period, or as half-months in a given labour market status or income from a given 
                                                                
11  Due to the very large number of tested variables, we abstain from presenting the results of the balancing tests. They are 
available on request. 
12  Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that for standard matching (based on a fixed number of comparison observations) 
bootstrap-based inference may be invalid. However, our matching algorithm is smoother than the one studied by Abadie 
and Imbens (2008) because it uses a variable number of (distance-weighted) comparisons and a regression adjustment. For 
this reason, the bootstrap is most likely a valid inference procedure in our context. 
13  See for instance MacKinnon (2006) for a discussion on bootstrapping symmetric statistics. Since the theoretical results by 
Abadie and Imbens (2006) and the simulation based results in Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2013) suggest that the 
estimator is asymptotically normally distributed, bootstrapping the potentially pivotal t-statistic (computed under the 
assumption that the weights obtained to compute the control group are non-stochastic; see Lechner, 2002) has the 
advantage of potentially providing so-called asymptotic refinements and thus improving inference. In addition we also 
checked the bootstrap distribution of the estimated effects, rather than the t-statistics. The results are similar (available on 
request). 
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source accumulated since July 2004.14 In the following, we present the results for selected 
outcomes, which we consider the most interesting. They include two measures of turnover, 
namely tenure in the studied firm and the number of individual employer changes, as well as 
the cumulated number of months in employment, unemployment, or in the firm-provided 
early retirement scheme (described in footnote 10 above). 
Below we report the so-called average treatment effect (ATE) of introducing SickAna or 
Courses compared to not introducing any measure. This corresponds to the effect for an em-
ployee randomly drawn from our estimation sample. Our empirical strategy also allows esti-
mating effects for different groups of employees. The average effect on the non-treated 
(ATENT) is the effect for an employee randomly drawn from the subsample of firms, which 
did not introduce any health measure. Since firms adopting health measures and their employ-
ees differ from those that do not, comparing ATE and ATENT is informative about potential 
effect heterogeneity. In Appendix B.2, we therefore additionally report the results for the 
ATENT. They are very similar suggesting that effect heterogeneity is limited.15  
Table 5.1: Average effects on tenure in the original establishment in days 
Health promotion measure Age Effect P-value in % 
Analysis of sickness absenteeism 31-40 83 16 
 
41-50 48 36 
 
51-60 54 28 
Health circles/courses 31-40 187** 3 
 
41-50 108* 10 
 
51-60 147*** 1 
Note:  */**/*** indicates significance on the 10/5/1% level. Inference is based on block bootstrapping p-values (clustered at 
the establishment level, 499 replications). Tenure refers to the time with the establishment after treatment from July 
2004 onwards. Tenure before that is a control variable. 
                                                                
14  To determine a unique labour market status for each period, the administrative records have been arranged as a panel data 
set with one observation for each half of a month in the period 1990-2008. 
15  The results for the average treatment on the treated (ATET), which is the effect for an employee randomly drawn from the 
subsample of firms which adopted a specific health measure, are also similar, but less precisely estimated. Detailed results 
are available on request. 
21  
Table 5.1 reports the ATEs on tenure in the firm (from July 2004 onwards) for each of 
the three age strata. In any of the latter, there are no significant effects of analysing sickness 
absenteeism, but large positive and statistically significant effects of health circles/courses. 
After firms introduced these measures, employees stayed with the firm for 4-6 more months 
longer than if the firm had not introduced these measures. Hence, establishments offering 
these measures seem to be employers that are more attractive. Moreover, this suggests that 
firms can save turnover costs by introducing such measures. 
Figure 5.1: Average effects on the number of employer changes 
    
Note:  Lines denote average treatment effects on the for respective age stratum. The symbol ‘▲’ denotes significance at 
the 5% level, while ‘’ denotes significance at the 10% level. The horizontal axis measures the number of months 
since June 2004 (half-yearly measurements in June and December of each year). Inference is based on block boot-
strapping p-values (clustered at the establishment level, 499 replications). 
There is also evidence, though somewhat weaker, that health circles/courses stabilise 
workers’ careers more generally by reducing the number of employer changes. Figure 5.1 
plots half-yearly measurements of the ATEs of introducing the respective health promotion 
measure compared to not introducing any measure from December 2004 to December 2008. 
Triangles appear if the effects are significant on the 5% level and diamond symbols when they 
are significant on the 10% level. About 3 years after introduction of the measures we find 
significant reductions in the number of employer changes of about 4 percentage points for 
workers aged 51-60, of 5-6 percentage point for 41-50-year olds, and of roughly 8 percentage 
points for workers aged 31-40. We also estimate drops in the number of employer changes of 
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roughly 4-5 percentage points for workers aged 50 or younger about 3 years after first ana-
lysing sickness absenteeism. However, few point estimates are significant. 
Figures 5.2 to 5.4 plot the ATEs on the cumulated number of months in unsubsidised 
employment, unemployment or the firm-provided early retirement scheme in a similar fashion 
as Figure 5.1. Tables B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B.3 report the results for the binary labour 
market status indicators measured in the second half of June or December of a given year (so-
called point-in-time estimates). There are no significant effects of introducing the analysis of 
sickness absenteeism on any outcome or age group. The only quantitatively larger effects ap-
pear for older workers in terms of participation in the firm-provided early retirement scheme, 
which is reduced by more than one month. The cumulated effects are never significant, while 
some of the longer run point-in-time estimates are marginally significant (see Table B.3). We 
do not find any significant or quantitatively noteworthy effects of introducing health cir-
cles/courses for workers aged 50 or younger either.  
However, there are interesting effects for older workers. After the introduction of health 
circles/courses, workers aged 51-60 are 4-7 percentage points more likely to be employed 
than without the introduction of the measures and in total, they spend about 3 months more in 
unsubsidised employment over the 4.5-year period following June 2004. Moreover, during the 
first 2 years, the elderly are 3-4 percentage points less likely to be unemployed and receive 
unemployment insurance payments, and in total they spend about 1.5 months less in unem-
ployment. During the first 1.5 years, they are also roughly 3-4 percentage points less likely to 
participate in the firm-provided early retirement scheme, which accumulates to being almost 
one month less in this scheme.16 Consequently, tax revenues and social insurance contribu-
tions increase while expenditures on unemployment and pension insurance fall. 
                                                                
16  The effects on earnings (coded as zero if not employed) show a similar pattern as the effects on employment but are never 
significant and thus omitted. The results for the other outcomes listed in Table A.1 also support the main conclusions, but 
lack precision in many cases which is why they are not reported either. 
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Figure 5.2: Average effects on cumulated unsubsidised employment in months 
     
Note:  Lines denote average treatment effects on the for respective age stratum. The symbol ‘▲’ denotes significance at 
the 5% level, while ‘’ denotes significance at the 10% level. The horizontal axis measures the number of months 
since June 2004 (half-yearly measurements in June and December of each year). Inference is based on block boot-
strapping p-values (clustered at the establishment level, 499 replications). 
Figure 5.3: Average effects on cumulated unemployment in months 
    
Note:  Lines denote average treatment effects on the for respective age stratum. The symbol ‘▲’ denotes significance at 
the 5% level, while ‘’ denotes significance at the 10% level. The horizontal axis measures the number of months 
since June 2004 (half-yearly measurements in June and December of each year). Inference is based on block boot-
strapping p-values (clustered at the establishment level, 499 replications). 
The cumulated effects may seem small at first sight. However, because of the tenure re-
quirement we impose for identification purposes, the workers in our sample have a quite 
strong labour market attachment (they were employed for 85-95% of the 10 years before July 
2002, see Table 3.2). Hence, unemployment risk and incentives to retire early should be com-
paratively low, which implies that the effects on (the relatively few) workers who would be-
come unemployed or decide to retire early in the absence of the health measures must be quite 
large. This is confirmed by the relatively large point-in-time effects. It follows that the aver-
age effects for older workers with weaker labour market attachment might be even larger. 
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However, for the sake of minimising self-selection into firms, we here focus on a more nar-
rowly defined population of workers. 
Figure 5.4: Average effects on months in firm-provided early retirement schemes 
    
Note:  Lines denote average treatment effects on the for respective age stratum. The symbol ‘▲’ denotes significance at 
the 5% level, while ‘’ denotes significance at the 10% level. The horizontal axis measures the number of months 
since June 2004 (half-yearly measurements in June and December of each year). Inference is based on block boot-
strapping p-values (clustered at the establishment level, 499 replications). 
The results also provide some insights on the credibility of our identification strategy. 
Firstly, if controlling for the variables available in the data was not sufficient for removing 
selection bias, one might see immediate ‘effects’ in the figures presented above, as there is no 
obvious reason why selection effects would need time to materialize - as opposed to true ef-
fects. However, effects immediately after introducing the health measures are largely absent 
and never significant, thus providing no evidence against the validity of our selection-on-ob-
servables strategy. Secondly, the fact that we mainly find effects for older workers, who are 
most likely to suffer from health problems, but not for younger workers in the same firms also 
speaks against selection effects, which should be similar for all employees of a firm. Finally, 
the firms which introduced health circles/courses are operating in less favourable labour mar-
kets than those which do not (see Table 3.2), suggesting that selection effects should lead to 
worse labour market outcomes of their employees. The fact that we find opposite effects sup-
ports our identification strategy. 
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6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we complement the literature on the effects of firm-provided workplace 
health promotion measures on workers’ health and firms’ economic situation by studying the 
effects on future labour market outcomes of the firms’ employees. Identification exploits rich 
survey and administrative data and is based on a combination of a selection-on-observables 
assumption and a particular usage of the panel structure of the data that allows controlling for 
time-constant unobserved factors and differential time trends. For estimation, we apply semi-
parametric radius matching on the propensity score with regression adjustment, which is 
flexible in terms of functional form assumptions and permits arbitrary effect heterogeneity 
with respect to observables. 
Our results suggest that analyses of sickness absenteeism, which involve employees 
only passively, have a rather limited impact on individual labour market outcomes by slightly 
reducing the number of job changes for younger workers. In contrast, health circles and health 
courses, which require an active engagement of the employees, appear to have a more pro-
found impact. They decrease the number of job changes in general (and more profoundly than 
the analyses of sickness absenteeism) leading to more stable work careers. Moreover, they 
increase tenure with the studied firm by 4-6 months for all age groups, which implies savings 
for firms in terms of turnover costs that come in addition to health-related cost savings 
documented in the existing literature. Finally and maybe most important from a policy 
perspective, health circles and health courses also increase the labour market attachment of 
older workers. They increase employment and reduce unemployment of these workers. They 
also reduce participation in special firm-provided early retirement schemes. Therefore, tax 
revenues and social insurance contributions increase while expenditures on unemployment 
and pension insurance fall. Again, this comes on top of the positive effects on workers’ health 
and the corresponding health-related cost savings documented in the earlier literature. Thus, it 
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might be advisable for policy makers to encourage firms to introduce health circles or health 
courses, especially given the demographic development in many countries. 
Further research should be devoted to a more thorough investigation of heterogeneity 
patterns to permit a more precise targeting of health promotion activities to groups that benefit 
most. Possible dimensions of interest are specific industries and occupations as well as partic-
ular types of employees with specific health risks, none of which could be investigated in this 
study due to sample size issues.  
Literature 
Abadie, A., and G. W. Imbens (2006): "Large Sample Properties of Matching Estimators for Average Treatment 
Effects", Econometrica, 74, 235-267. 
Abadie, A., and G. W. Imbens (2008): "On the Failure of the Bootstrap for Matching Estimators", Econometrica, 
76, 1537-1557. 
Biewen, M., B. Fitzenberger, R. Osikominu, and M. Paul (2013): “The Effectiveness of Public Sponsored Train-
ing Revisited: The Importance of Data and Methodological Choices”, forthcoming in Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics. 
BMAS (2014): “Sicherheit und Gesundheit bei der Arbeit 2012 - Unfallverhütungsbericht Arbeit“, Bundesmi-
nisterium für Arbeit und Soziales (BMAS). 
Böckerman P., and P. Ilmakunnas (2009): "Unemployment And Self-Assessed Health: Evidence From Panel 
Data", Health Economics, 18, 161-179. 
Dehejia, R. H., and S. Wahba (2002): "Propensity-Score-Matching Methods for Nonexperimental Causal Stud-
ies", Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 151-161. 
Fielding, J. E., and P. V. Piserchia (1989): "Frequency of worksite health promotion activities", American Jour-
nal of Public Health, 79, 16–20. 
Hollederer, A. (2007): "Betriebliche Gesundheitsförderung in Deutschland—Ergebnisse des IAB-Betriebspanels 
2002 und 2004", Gesundheitswesen, 69, 63–76. 
Huber, M., M. Lechner, and C. Wunsch (2011): "Does Leaving Welfare Improve Health? Evidence for Ger-
many", Health Economics, 20, 484-504. 
Huber, M., M. Lechner, and C. Wunsch (2013): "The Performance of Estimators Based on the Propensity 
Score“, Journal of Econometrics, 175, 1-21. 
IGA (2009): “Health in the workplace – A guide to health at work”, published by Initiative Gesundheit und Ar-
beit (IGA), BKK Bundesverband, Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung, BGAG – Institut Arbeit und Ge-
sundheit der DGUV, AOK-Bundesverband, Verband der Ersatzkassen e.V.. 
27  
Joffe, M. M., T. R. Have, H. I. Feldman, and S. Kimmel (2004): "Model Selection, Confounder Control, and 
Marginal Structural Models", The American Statistician, 58-4, 272-279. 
Jung, J., A. Nitzsche, L. Ansmann, N. Ernstmann, O. Ommen, B. Stieler-Lorenz, J. Wasem, and H. Pfaff (2012): 
"Organizational factors and the attitude toward health promotion in German ICT-companies", Health Promo-
tion International, 27, 382-393. 
Kenkel, D., and D. Supina (1992): The determinants of worksite health promotion, Economics Letters, 40, 345-
351. 
Kreis, J. and W. Bödeker (2004): “Health-related and economic benefits of workplace health promotion and 
prevention - Summary of the scientific evidence”, IGA Report 3e, published by the BKK Federation and the 
Federation of Institutions for Statutory Accident Insurance and Prevention. 
Lechner, M. (2002): Some practical issues in the evaluation of heterogeneous labour market programmes by 
matching methods, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, Statistics in Society, 165, 59-82. 
Lechner, M. and C. Wunsch (2013): "Sensitivity of Matching-Based Program Evaluations to the Availability of 
Control Variables", Labour Economics, 21, 111-121. 
Lechner, M., R. Miquel, and C. Wunsch (2011): "Long-Run Effects of Public Sector Sponsored Training in West 
Germany", Journal of the European Economic Association, 9, 742-784. 
MacKinnon, J. G. (2006). "Bootstrap Methods in Econometrics", The Economic Record, 82, 2-18.  
New York Times (2013): “As OSHA Emphasizes Safety, Long-Term Health Risks Fester”, online edition, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/us/osha-emphasizes-safety-health-risks-fester.html  (accessed August, 
26, 2013). 
Köhler, T., C. Janssen, C. S. Plath, S. Steinhausen, and H. Pfaff (2009): "Determinanten der betrieblichen Ge-
sundheitsförderung in der Versicherungsbranche: Ergebnisse einer Vollerhebung bei deutschen Versicherun-
gen im Jahr 2006", Gesundheitswesen, 71, 722–731. 
Rosenbaum, P. R., and D. B. Rubin (1983): "The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for 
causal effects", Biometrika, 70, 41-50. 
Rubin, D. B. (1979): "Using Multivariate Matched Sampling and Regression Adjustment to Control Bias in 
Observational Studies", Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, 318-328. 
Sockoll, I., I. Kramer, and W. Bödeker (2009): “Effectiveness and economic benefits of workplace health pro-
motion and prevention - Summary of the scientific evidence 2000 to 2006”, IGA Report 13e, published by 
the Federal Association of Company Health Insurance Funds. 
Ulmer, J. and F. Gröben (2005): "Work place health promotion. A longitudinal study in companies placed in 
Hessen and Thueringen", Journal of Public Health, 13, 144-152. 
Wunsch, C. (2013): “Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance“, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 95, 1030-1045. 
Wunsch, C., and M. Lechner (2008): "What Did All the Money Do? On the General Ineffectiveness of Recent 
West German Labour Market Programmes", Kyklos, 61, 134-174. 
  
28  
Appendix A: Further descriptive statistics 
Table A.1: Transition matrix for the use of different health measures 
Note: The numbers refer to all establishments, which participated in the 2002 and in the 2004 waves of the IAB Establish-
ment Panel, have non-missing entries for the respective question and are part of the linked-employer-employee data 
used in this project. The shaded cells indicate the firms that are relevant for the empirical analysis before removing 
firms with at least one measure in 2002 and before applying further restrictions to ensure common support. 
(a) Analysis of sickness absenteeism 
  2004  
2002 No Yes Total 
No 460 308 768 
Yes 340 1,123 1,463 
Total 800 1,431 2,231 
 
(b) Surveys of employees about health risks at the workplace 
  2004  
2002 No Yes Total 
No 1,102 344 1,446 
Yes 354 431 785 
Total 1,456 775 2,231 
 
(c) Discussion groups about health problems in the workplace (health circles) 
  2004  
2002 No Yes Total 
No 1,456 218 1,674 
Yes 276 281 557 
Total 1,732 499 2,231 
 
(d) Courses with information about healthy behaviour 
  2004  
2002 No Yes Total 
No 1,230 322 1,552 
Yes 253 426 679 
Total 1,483 748 2,231 
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Table A.2: Outcome variables 
Age of worker in 2004 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60 
Establishment health policy (treatment) None SickA Cour None SickA Cour None SickA Cour 
Employed end of   2/2004 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.81 0.82 0.84 
   1/2005 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.76 0.78 0.79 
   2/2005 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.72 0.74 0.76 
   1/2006 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.69 0.70 0.73 
   2/2006 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.66 0.67 0.70 
   1/2007 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.62 0.64 0.66 
   2/2007 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.60 0.60 0.63 
   1/2008 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.56 0.57 0.59 
   2/2008 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.54 0.54 0.57 
Minor employment end of  2/2004 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
   1/2005 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 
   2/2005 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 
   1/2006 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
   2/2006 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
   1/2007 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 
   2/2007 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 
   1/2008 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 
   2/2008 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06 
In early retirement                 2/2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.10 
scheme end of  1/2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.11 
   2/2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.11 
   1/2006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.13 
   2/2006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.14 
   1/2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.15 
   2/2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.15 
   1/2008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.15 
   2/2008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.15 
Unemployed end of  2/2004 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.04 
   1/2005 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.05 
   2/2005 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.05 
   1/2006 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.05 
   2/2006 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.05 
   1/2007 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.05 
   2/2007 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.04 
   1/2008 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04 
   2/2008 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Received unemployment  2/2004 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.04 
benefits end of  1/2005 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.04 
   2/2005 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.04 
   1/2006 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.04 
   2/2006 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.04 
   1/2007 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.04 
   2/2007 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.03 
   1/2008 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 
   2/2008 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Out-of-labour-force end of  2/2004 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.12 
   1/2005 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.15 
   2/2005 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.18 0.18 0.19 
   1/2006 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.21 0.21 
   2/2006 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.24 0.24 0.24 
   1/2007 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.29 0.28 0.29 
   2/2007 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.32 0.32 0.32 
   1/2008 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.37 0.37 0.36 
   2/2008 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.41 0.40 0.39 
 Note: Table A.2 to be continued. 
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Table A.2 continued 
Age of worker in 2004 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60 
Establishment health policy (treatment) None SickA Cour None SickA Cour None SickA Cour 
Cumulated half months of  2/2004 11.07 11.17 11.30 11.16 11.28 11.48 9.89 9.97 10.22 
employment until end of  1/2005 21.97 22.16 22.34 22.16 22.42 22.70 19.21 19.48 19.84 
   2/2005 32.78 33.13 33.38 33.06 33.49 33.90 28.07 28.57 29.12 
   1/2006 43.53 44.09 44.40 43.85 44.48 45.01 36.39 37.11 38.05 
   2/2006 54.36 55.09 55.39 54.68 55.41 56.08 44.43 45.32 46.66 
   1/2007 65.16 66.07 66.33 65.44 66.25 67.06 52.08 53.14 54.74 
   2/2007 75.94 76.99 77.24 76.09 77.05 78.03 59.35 60.55 62.46 
   1/2008 86.65 87.82 88.11 86.69 87.67 88.94 66.22 67.50 69.64 
   2/2008 97.36 98.64 98.99 97.25 98.17 99.78 72.79 74.15 76.55 
Cumulated half-months in 2/2004 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.39 0.46 0.37 0.48 0.47 0.55 
minor emploment until  1/2005 0.98 1.12 1.03 0.84 0.95 0.76 1.02 0.95 1.05 
end of   2/2005 1.50 1.72 1.57 1.28 1.40 1.15 1.57 1.43 1.56 
   1/2006 2.06 2.32 2.13 1.76 1.95 1.62 2.14 1.97 2.14 
   2/2006 2.62 2.93 2.70 2.24 2.45 2.10 2.78 2.55 2.78 
   1/2007 3.21 3.61 3.35 2.74 2.98 2.52 3.42 3.17 3.43 
   2/2007 3.75 4.21 3.94 3.23 3.50 2.93 4.12 3.87 4.10 
   1/2008 4.32 4.80 4.51 3.74 4.04 3.44 4.85 4.62 4.76 
   2/2008 4.87 5.41 5.08 4.25 4.55 3.92 5.66 5.43 5.45 
Cumulated half-months in  2/2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.41 1.31 1.28 
early retirement scheme 1/2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.80 2.58 2.51 
until  end of  2/2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.21 3.86 3.82 
   1/2006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.63 5.16 5.33 
   2/2006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 7.07 6.45 7.01 
   1/2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 8.52 7.65 8.76 
   2/2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.10 9.93 8.81 10.59 
   1/2008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.17 11.29 9.92 12.37 
   2/2008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.10 0.28 12.61 11.03 14.14 
Cumulated half months in  2/2004 0.43 0.41 0.26 0.49 0.38 0.27 0.79 0.75 0.43 
unemployment until  1/2005 0.87 0.89 0.57 0.99 0.85 0.64 1.70 1.59 0.99 
end of   2/2005 1.36 1.36 0.88 1.56 1.33 1.03 2.76 2.42 1.57 
   1/2006 1.84 1.82 1.19 2.15 1.81 1.42 4 3.43 2.20 
   2/2006 2.25 2.21 1.47 2.69 2.27 1.77 5.09 4.41 2.76 
   1/2007 2.63 2.57 1.73 3.18 2.73 2.08 6.10 5.27 3.35 
   2/2007 3.00 2.91 1.94 3.69 3.15 2.36 7.02 6.07 3.88 
   1/2008 3.36 3.30 2.17 4.16 3.55 2.65 7.84 6.75 4.41 
   2/2008 3.68 3.66 2.39 4.60 3.95 2.93 8.37 7.31 4.84 
Cumulated half months in  2/2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
income support (‘Hartz IV’) 1/2005 0.15 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.08 
end middle of  2/2005 0.30 0.40 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.14 
   1/2006 0.46 0.61 0.33 0.30 0.41 0.31 0.22 0.25 0.20 
   2/2006 0.62 0.83 0.45 0.41 0.56 0.43 0.32 0.35 0.28 
   1/2007 0.77 1.04 0.58 0.52 0.73 0.57 0.44 0.46 0.37 
   2/2007 0.93 1.24 0.70 0.62 0.89 0.71 0.55 0.59 0.47 
   1/2008 1.08 1.45 0.81 0.72 1.07 0.85 0.68 0.74 0.58 
   2/2008 1.22 1.65 0.93 0.83 1.24 0.96 0.80 0.87 0.69 
Part-time employed  2/2004 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.29 
end of   1/2005 0.18 0.16 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.24 0.22 0.28 
   2/2005 0.18 0.16 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.28 
   1/2006 0.19 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.28 
   2/2006 0.19 0.17 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.23 0.21 0.28 
   1/2007 0.19 0.17 0.26 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.22 0.20 0.28 
   2/2007 0.19 0.17 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.27 
   1/2008 0.19 0.17 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.21 0.19 0.25 
   2/2008 0.19 0.17 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.21 0.19 0.25 
Tenure after June 30, 2004 in days 1777 1897 1899 1872 1973 2001 1540 1630 1667 
Note: Table A.2 to be continued. 
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Table A.2 continued 
Age of worker in 2004 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60 
Establishment health policy (treatment) None SickA Cour None SickA Cour None SickA Cour 
Half monthly earnings 2/2004 1184 1196 1179 1226 1232 1234 1062 1098 1039 
end of   1/2005 1157 1175 1164 1197 1208 1194 982 1031 969 
   2/2005 1152 1173 1164 1188 1205 1193 932 990 939 
   1/2006 1150 1175 1152 1173 1188 1159 870 920 873 
   2/2006 1144 1179 1153 1169 1183 1157 834 888 839 
   1/2007 1139 1172 1129 1143 1167 1130 769 822 766 
   2/2007 1138 1167 1133 1142 1159 1137 734 773 732 
   1/2008 1127 1148 1131 1124 1115 1113 671 709 671 
   2/2008 1128 1151 1132 1116 1114 1107 642 671 648 
Cumulated half-months in 2/2004 2.09 1.88 2.96 2.30 2.25 3.42 3.05 2.61 3.60 
Part-time employment until 1/2005 4.22 3.84 6 4.64 4.56 6.92 6.01 5.25 7.01 
end of   2/2005 6.35 5.78 9.03 6.96 6.84 10.40 8.88 7.79 10.39 
   1/2006 8.56 7.79 12.05 9.32 9.24 13.95 11.71 10.33 13.76 
   2/2006 10.82 9.82 15.12 11.68 11.59 17.48 14.52 12.85 17.15 
   1/2007 13.06 11.92 18.25 14.05 13.96 21 17.26 15.31 20.53 
   2/2007 15.34 13.96 21.38 16.48 16.32 24.49 19.92 17.68 23.84 
   1/2008 17.65 15.98 24.46 18.90 18.66 28.04 22.48 19.99 26.96 
   2/2008 19.97 18.02 27.55 21.35 20.99 31.54 25.01 22.26 29.97 
Cumulated earnings /100 2/2004 142 144 141 147 148 148 129 133 126 
until end of   1/2005 281 285 280 291 293 291 249 259 243 
   2/2005 420 426 420 434 438 434 363 380 358 
   1/2006 557 567 558 575 580 573 469 493 464 
   2/2006 695 708 696 715 723 712 571 602 566 
   1/2007 831 848 832 852 863 848 665 702 660 
   2/2007 968 989 968 989 1003 984 755 798 749 
   1/2008 1100 1126 1103 1120 1137 1118 837 885 831 
   2/2008 1230 1265 1239 1250 1271 1251 916 967 910 
Cumulated half-months in 2/2004 0.48 0.39 0.44 0.33 0.31 0.23 1.29 1.25 1.32 
out-of-labour-force  1/2005 1.09 0.90 1.05 0.76 0.65 0.59 3 2.84 3.08 
until end of  2/2005 1.73 1.40 1.68 1.24 1.05 0.96 4.98 4.80 5.12 
   1/2006 2.41 1.93 2.31 1.74 1.48 1.38 7.27 7.09 7.47 
   2/2006 3.12 2.50 3.01 2.31 2.01 1.89 10.01 9.78 10.19 
   1/2007 3.88 3.11 3.79 2.99 2.65 2.55 13.23 12.98 13.44 
   2/2007 4.69 3.79 4.63 3.77 3.37 3.23 16.90 16.63 17.10 
   1/2008 5.56 4.53 5.50 4.64 4.26 3.99 21.07 20.84 21.30 
   2/2008 6.47 5.29 6.38 5.57 5.29 4.83 25.80 25.47 25.85 
Number of employer 2/2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
changes until   1/2005 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
end of   2/2005 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
   1/2006 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 
   2/2006 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 
   1/2007 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 
   2/2007 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 
   1/2008 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.05 
   2/2008 0.22 0.19 0.10 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.07 
Number of terminations 2/2004 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
of employment due  1/2005 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
to longer illness until 2/2005 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 
end of   1/2006 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 
   2/2006 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 
   1/2007 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10 
   2/2007 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.12 
   1/2008 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.13 
   2/2008 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 
# of employees (observations) 6247 4858 3312 6613 4622 3420 4366 3073 2135 
Note:  1/200x denotes the first half of the 200x, while 2/200x denotes the second half of this year. 
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Table A.3: Selection of variables determined prior to treatment 
Age in 2002 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60 
Establishment health policy (treatment) None SickA Cour None SickA Cour None SickA Cour 
Women (share) 0.39 0.37 0.49 0.42 0.44 0.55 0.44 0.43 0.52 
Age (in years) 35.9 35.8 35.9 45.3 45.3 45.2 54.9 54.8 54.8 
Foreigner (share) 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 
Half-monthly earnings in June 2002/1000 1.26 1.27 1.26 1.30 1.30 1.28 1.29 1.33 1.24 
Tenure in June 2002 in years 2.56 2.51 2.62 2.90 2.83 3.05 3.07 3.09 3.27 
Part-time employed (share) 0.17 0.15 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.30 
No vocational degree (share) 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.15 
University or polytechnical degree (share) 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.05 
Vocational degree missing (share) 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.07 
Occupation in manufactoring (share) 0.10 0.22 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.07 
Low skilled occupation (share) 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.19 
Occupation in construction (share) 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.08 
Technical occupation (share) 0.19 0.23 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.08 0.18 0.22 0.10 
Manufacturing (sector) (share) 0.46 0.62 0.29 0.47 0.58 0.25 0.43 0.58 0.27 
Construction, trade (sector) (share) 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.14 0.17 
Share employed in past 10 years 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.94 
Share unemployed in past 10 years 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Share inactive in past 10 years 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Central German states (share) 0.34 0.31 0.41 0.35 0.31 0.44 0.38 0.32 0.42 
Jobs per inhabitant aged 15-64 1.18 1.00 0.84 1.13 1.20 0.69 1.36 1.24 0.74 
Growth of regional GDP 1994 to 2002 in % 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.19 
Number of employees in establishment  301 304 361 304 301 372 298 310 364 
Problems with high absenteeism 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 
Difficulties hiring skilled employees (share) 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.33 0.38 0.46 0.33 0.38 0.51 
Investment per employee / 10000 0.75 0.68 0.35 0.77 0.72 0.33 0.74 0.65 0.30 
No use of government subsidies 0.52 0.52 0.40 0.51 0.52 0.39 0.48 0.54 0.37 
Subject to sectoral wage contract (share) 0.80 0.79 0.71 0.81 0.79 0.71 0.84 0.81 0.74 
Firm-specific wage contract (share) 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.11 
Firm follows sectoral wage contract (share) 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.07 
Not subject to general wage contract (share) 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 
Firm has a work council (share) 0.80 0.86 0.89 0.84 0.87 0.91 0.86 0.89 0.90 
Firm with single establishm. (share) 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.44 0.51 0.52 0.42 0.46 0.49 
Establishment is headquarter (share) 0.28 0.25 0.15 0.24 0.23 0.11 0.27 0.28 0.13 
Establishment is regional unit (share) 0.22 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.34 0.24 0.24 0.34 
Share of determinations of employment 
contracts due to longer illness in past 10 y. 
0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.18 
Note:  Based on the samples used for estimation. If not explicitly mentioned otherwise, variables are measured in 2002. Appendix B: Additional results B.1 Propensity scores 
In this section, we show the detailed specification and estimation results for the propen-
sity scores used in the estimation. 
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Table B.1: Probit estimation results for the probability to be treated 
Treatment Analysis of sickness absenteeism Health circles/courses 
Startum 31-40 41-50 51-60 31-40 41-50 51-60 
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
Women 0.15 0.0 0.22 0.0 0.22 0.0 0.08 3.0 0.13 0.0 0.05 28.3 
Age -0.01 25.8 0.01 62.4 0.01 78.5 -0.01 17.1 -0.02 0.1 0.01 50.5 
Foreigner 0.17 0.1 0.03 57.9 -0.08 18.9 0.02 80.9 --  -0.15 4.6 
Earnings  0.18 0.0 0.16 0.0 0.13 0.3 0.21 0.0 0.18 0.0 -0.05 35.3 
Tenure in months -0.02 18.3 -0.03 1.8 -0.03 21.4 0.03 16.0 0.05 0.1 0.12 0.0 
Part time employ. 0.05 28.8 0.05 16.5 0.02 60.5 0.04 30.3 0.12 0.5 -0.07 15.3 
No vocat. degree -0.08 5.9 -0.22 0.0 -0.22 0.0 -0.28 0.0 -0.28 0.0 -0.27 0.0 
University/polytech. -0.08 14.1 -0.09 5.7 0.08 18.7 0.04 45.9 0.01 84.7 -0.04 65.2 
Voc. degree missing 0.70 0.0 0.70 0.0 0.69 0.0 0.17 2.4 0.16 1.4 0.30 0.0 
Occ. in manufact. 0.41 0.0 0.44 0.0 0.41 0.0 0.22 0.1 0.19 0.2 0.13 10.3 
Low skilled service 
occupation  
-0.15 0.2 0.06 18.6 0.12 3.2 -0.13 1.0 0.03 50.5 0.17 0.5 
Occ. in construction -0.11 1.7 0.05 28.7 -0.01 81.1 -0.26 0.0 -0.15 0.7 -0.23 0.1 
Technical occupat. 0.21 0.0 0.33 0.0 0.17 0.0 -0.16 0.2 -0.15 0.3 -0.19 0.2 
Share UE last 10 y. 0.51 0.8 0.86 0.0 0.42 23.2 --  --  --  
Share inactive … 0.57 25.6 0.27 65.6 0.69 43.9 --  --  --  
Share employed… -0.36 0.0 -0.16 12.6 0.03 84.0 -0.48 0.0 --  -0.07 67.6 
Northern states -0.21 0.0 -0.34 0.0 -0.30 0.0 --  --  --  
Central states -0.29 0.0 -0.37 0.0 -0.40 0.0 -0.20 0.0 -0.12 0.0 -0.21 0.0 
Jobs per inhabitant 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Reg. GDP growth -2.01 0.0 -1.61 0.0 -2.06 0.0 -2.36 0.0 -2.41 0.0 -3.08 0.0 
Manufact. (sector) 0.33 0.0 0.34 0.0 0.43 0.0 -0.46 0.0 -0.43 0.0 -0.22 0.0 
Construction, trade 0.15 0.0 0.13 0.1 0.01 86.7 -0.32 1.8 -0.36 0.0 -0.21 0.0 
Age of establish. 0.01 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.01 0.0 -- 0.0 0.01 0.3 
# of employees (ln) 0.04 12.4 0.05 3.7 0.12 0.1 0.29 0.0 0.43 0.0 0.39 0.0 
Hiring difficulties  0.19 0.0 0.17 0.0 0.22 0.0 0.50 0.0 0.59 0.0 0.77 0.0 
Sect. wage contract 
& many absences 
-0.45 0.0 -0.50 0.0 -0.57 0.0 -0.37 0.0 -0.26 0.0 -0.34 0.0 
Work council 0.44 0.0 0.42 0.0 0.53 0.0 0.28 0.0 -- 1.8 0.45 0.0 
Firm with single 
establishment 
0.12 0.0 0.24 0.0 0.13 0.0 0.32 0.0 0.34 0.0 0.39 0.0 
Investment per 
employee / 10000 
-0.02 5.6 0.01 75.7 -0.02 20.8 -0.42 46.9 -0.21 0.0 -0.29 0.0 
No use of subsidies 0.14 0.0 0.07 0.9 0.27 0.0 -0.02 0.0 -0.07  0.04 28.2 
Work. time accounts 0.40 0.0 --  --  0.70 0.0 --  --  
Share of termina-
tions of employment 
contracts due to 
longer illness past 
10 y. 
0.89 0.2 1.07 0.0 0.95 1.1 0.75 2.0 --  1.19 0.2 
 < 0.15 --  --  --  --  -0.45 0.0 --  
 > 0.2 --  --  --  --  -0.19 0.0 --  
Pseudo-R2 in %  14.1  11.5  13.7  23.8  22.2  24.1 
# of unique establishments  197  196  197  163  162  163 
Note:  --: Variable omitted from particular specification. All specifications include a constant term. Coefficient estimates 
obtained by maximum likelihood. P-values are based on asymptotic distribution not accounting for clustering and 
given in %. The dependent variable equals 1 if observation is treated.  
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B.2 Average treatment effects for the non-treated 
As already mentioned in the main text (see Section 5.2), one way to assess potential ef-
fect heterogeneity is to compare the average effects for workers in establishments without any 
health promotion measure to the average effects for all workers. The reason is that non-treated 
firms and their employees differ systematically from the average firm and its employees. Here 
we present the results for workers in non-treated firms (which are very similar to the average 
effects). 
Table B.2: Average effects on tenure in the original establishment in days 
Health promotion measure Age Effect P-value in % 
Analysis of sickness absen-
teeism 31-40 85 26 
 
41-50 40 55 
 
51-60 87 25 
Health circles/courses 31-40 200*** 1 
 
41-50 157** 4 
 
51-60 185*** 0 
Note:  */**/*** indicates significance on the 10/5/1% level. Inference is based on block bootstrapping p-values (clustered at 
the establishment level, 499 replications). Tenure refers to the time with the establishment after treatment measured 
from July 2004. Tenure before that is a control variable. 
Figure B.1: Average effects on the number of employer changes 
    
Note:  Lines denote average treatment effects on the for respective age stratum. The symbol ‘▲’ denotes significance at 
the 5% level, while ‘’ denotes significance at the 10% level. The horizontal axis measures the number of months 
since June 2004 (half-yearly measurements in June and December of each year). Inference is based on block boot-
strapping p-values (clustered at the establishment level, 499 replications). 
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Figure B.2: Average effects on cumulated unsubsidised employment in months 
     
Note:  See note to Figure B.1. 
Figure B.3: Average effects on cumulated unemployment in months 
    
Note:  See note to Figure B.1. 
Figure B.4: Average effects on months in firm-provided early retirement scheme 
    
Note:  See note to Figure B.1. 
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B.3 Point-in-time estimates 
Table B.3: Effects of analysing sickness absenteeism on the probability to be in a certain la-
bour market state in percentage points 
  
Age 31-40 Age 41-50 Age 51-60 
  
ATENT ATE ATENT ATE ATENT ATE 
Employed end of  2/2004 0.016 
 
0.011 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.003 
 
0.019 
 
0.009 
 
 
1/2005 0.020 
 
0.013 
 
0.013 
 
0.011 
 
0.031 
 
0.020 
 
 
2/2005 0.021 
 
0.015 
 
0.017 
 
0.011 
 
0.039 
 
0.018 
 
 
1/2006 0.021 
 
0.018 
 
0.022 
 
0.013 
 
0.033 
 
0.009 
 
 
2/2006 0.019 
 
0.018 
 
0.004 
 
0.001 
 
0.043 
 
0.015 
 
 
1/2007 0.018 
 
0.016 
 
0.018 
 
0.012 
 
0.035 
 
0.013 
 
 
2/2007 0.017 
 
0.011 
 
0.016 
 
0.011 
 
0.030 
 
0.008 
 
 
1/2008 0.015 
 
0.013 
 
0.000 
 
-0.005 
 
0.035 
 
0.006 
 
 
2/2008 0.012 
 
0.006 
 
0.000 
 
-0.005 
 
0.031 
 
0.006 
 In early retirement 2/2004 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.016 
 scheme end of  1/2005 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.018 
 
 
2/2005 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.018 
 
 
1/2006 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.017 
 
 
2/2006 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.022 
 
 
1/2007 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.041 
 
-0.033 * 
 
2/2007 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.029 
 
 
1/2008 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.031 * 
 
2/2008 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.004 * -0.027 
 
-0.025 
 Unemployed 2/2004 -0.010 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.004 
 
0.002 
 
-0.001 
 end of 1/2005 -0.008 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.016 
 
 
2/2005 -0.013 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.035 * -0.026 * 
 
1/2006 -0.006 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.007 
 
 
2/2006 -0.005 
 
-0.004 
 
0.003 
 
0.001 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.011 
 
 
1/2007 -0.011 * -0.009 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.003 
 
 
2/2007 -0.003 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.007 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
 
1/2008 -0.004 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.004 
 
0.010 
 
0.004 
 
 
2/2008 -0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
0.012 
 
0.007 
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
 On unemployment 2/2004 -0.007 
 
-0.004 
 
0.004 
 
0.000 
 
0.004 
 
0.000 
 insurance end of  1/2005 -0.008 ** -0.004 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.013 
 
 
2/2005 -0.004 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.021 
 
 
1/2006 -0.005 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.005 
 
 
2/2006 -0.001 
 
0.002 
 
0.008 
 
0.004 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.006 
 
 
1/2007 -0.008 *** -0.007 ** -0.005 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
0.002 
 
 
2/2007 -0.003 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.009 
 
0.005 
 
0.002 
 
 
1/2008 -0.004 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.004 
 
 
2/2008 0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.010 
 
0.006 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 Note: */**/*** indicates significance on the 10/5/1% level. Inference is based on block bootstrapping p-val-
ues (clustered at the establishment level, 499 replications). 
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Table B.4: Effects of health circles/courses on the probability to be in a certain labour market 
state in percentage points 
  
Age 31-40 Age 41-50 Age 51-60 
  
ATENT ATE ATENT ATE ATENT ATE 
Employed end of  2/2004 0.019 
 
0.015 
 
0.011 
 
0.009 
 
0.037 
 
0.044 * 
 
1/2005 0.019 
 
0.015 
 
0.005 
 
-0.001 
 
0.037 
 
0.039 * 
 
2/2005 0.029 
 
0.021 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
0.058 * 0.051 ** 
 
1/2006 0.027 
 
0.018 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.008 
 
0.084 *** 0.071 ** 
 
2/2006 0.034 * 0.023 
 
0.013 
 
0.005 
 
0.079 ** 0.064 * 
 
1/2007 0.014 
 
0.004 
 
0.013 
 
0.004 
 
0.069 ** 0.055 * 
 
2/2007 0.024 
 
0.019 
 
0.019 
 
0.009 
 
0.064 ** 0.048 * 
 
1/2008 0.014 
 
0.006 
 
0.019 
 
0.010 
 
0.049 * 0.037 
 
 
2/2008 0.014 
 
0.006 
 
0.023 
 
0.014 
 
0.055 * 0.046 
 In early retirement 2/2004 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.034 
 scheme end of  1/2005 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.044 * -0.037 * 
 
2/2005 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.030 
 
 
1/2006 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.005 
 
0.000 
 
 
2/2006 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.007 
 
0.005 
 
0.006 
 
0.007 
 
 
1/2007 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.005 
 
0.003 
 
0.015 
 
0.013 
 
 
2/2007 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.003 
 
0.002 
 
0.026 
 
0.025 
 
 
1/2008 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
0.019 
 
0.022 
 
 
2/2008 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.004 
 
0.003 
 
0.021 
 
0.024 
 Unemployed 2/2004 -0.011 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.026 
 end of 1/2005 -0.003 
 
-0.003 
 
0.007 
 
0.009 
 
-0.036 * -0.033 * 
 
2/2005 -0.014 
 
-0.011 
 
0.001 
 
0.003 
 
-0.058 ** -0.047 *** 
 
1/2006 -0.005 
 
-0.002 
 
0.003 
 
0.005 
 
-0.052 ** -0.039 ** 
 
2/2006 -0.013 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.005 
 
0.000 
 
-0.040 * -0.024 
 
 
1/2007 -0.002 
 
0.000 
 
-0.015 * -0.007 
 
-0.038 * -0.022 
 
 
2/2007 -0.007 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.015 * -0.007 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.006 
 
 
1/2008 0.005 
 
0.003 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.001 
 
 
2/2008 0.007 
 
0.004 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.004 
 
0.019 
 
0.015 
 On unemployment 2/2004 -0.005 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.031 * -0.030 * 
insurance end of  1/2005 0.003 
 
0.002 
 
0.011 
 
0.012 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.026 
 
 
2/2005 -0.003 
 
-0.003 
 
0.001 
 
0.003 
 
-0.048 ** -0.039 ** 
 
1/2006 -0.006 
 
-0.004 
 
0.007 
 
0.006 
 
-0.047 ** -0.036 ** 
 
2/2006 -0.007 * -0.004 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.037 ** -0.022 
 
 
1/2007 -0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.013 ** -0.008 * -0.037 ** -0.023 
 
 
2/2007 -0.009 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.017 ** -0.010 ** -0.019 
 
-0.010 
 
 
1/2008 0.002 
 
0.001 
 
-0.012 * -0.008 * -0.018 
 
-0.008 
 
 
2/2008 0.007 
 
0.003 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.003 
 
0.005 
 
0.004 
 Note: */**/*** indicates significance on the 10/5/1% level. Inference is based on block bootstrap-
ping p-values (clustered at the establishment level, 499 replications). 
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Appendix C: More details on the definition of the treatment 
Figure C. 1: Cut-and-paste from the original questionnaire  
 
Translation:  “Beyond what is required by law, which measures to protect and improve the health of your employees are 
you implementing or supporting financially? Please indicate in the following list which items are true for your 
establishment.  
 
A. Analysis of sick leave 
B. Surveys of employees about health risks at the workplace 
C. Discussion groups about health problems in the establishment (health circles) 
D. Courses with information about healthy behaviour  
E. Other, in particular: < fill in > 
F. None of the above” 
Note that indicating multiple measures is possible. The first treatment (SickAna) used in 
the main body of the paper consists of workers in those establishments indicating ‘A’, the 
second one consists of workers in establishments indicating ‘C’ and/or ‘D’ (Course). In either 
case, the control group consists of those establishments indicating option ‘F’ (only). 
